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ABSTRACT
Security-based Risk Assessment for Software Architecture

Fadi Haj Said

Enterprise, medium and small companies develop and maintain different types of
large-scale software systems for public and financial institutes. A security failure in such
systems could lead to a significant impact. It is therefore essential to analyze security risk in
the system components early on during the development process in order to prevent the
occurrence of security failures.
The objective of this research is to develop a methodology for security risk
assessment during the early software development phases to identify high security risk
elements, thus enabling us to enhance security features in the early phases of software
lifecycle. This methodology can be integrated with other methodologies for assessing risk in
software attributes such as performance, reliability, and maintainability in order to enhance
resource allocation decision and to improve the quality of software products.
We propose an architectural level security assessment methodology to assess the
security risk of software systems early on in the software life cycle. It combines the
probability of security failure and the severity associated with such failures to estimate the
risk factors. This research presents first a methodology that uses UML specifications to
estimate the probability of security failure for each component for a given scenario of a given

use case. The research also proposes a new methodology to estimate the severity of security
failure based on the data sensitivity, access rights, and reachability matrix. These
methodologies define a security risk assessment model that enables us to identify high
security risk elements. We illustrate this model using a scenario of an ecommerce case study.
Validation of security risk assessment is a challenging and a relatively unexplored
area. In this research, we conduct two validation studies of the proposed methodologies
based on Microsoft Security Bulletins and two security design patterns.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview:
Stable software architecture is the key to build a software system with high
quality attributes. Software architecture clarifies the structure of the system in terms of
components and interactions among them to accomplish the desired requirements
(Components and Connectors). The software architecture [51][7] for concurrent and
distributed applications can be designed by means of component and connectors. The
components address the functionality of a system, whereas connectors deal with
communications between components in that system. Furthermore, it supports many
software development paradigms such as COTS-based software development, product
line engineering and component based software engineering. In [50], Shaw was the first
to promote the shift to architectural view from functional view of software development,
and that has been adopted widely since. As architecture became a more significant
artifact in developing software systems, the need to quantitatively analyze them has
become notable. The architecture quantitative analysis should reflect their related quality
attributes and help us to predict the quality of the software products instantiated from it.

According to NASA-STD-8719.13A standard [38] risk is a function of the
anticipated frequency of occurrence of an undesired event, the potential severity of
resulting consequences, and the uncertainties associated with the frequency and severity.
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This standard defines several types of risk, such as for example availability risk,
acceptance risk, performance risk, cost risk, schedule risk, and security risk etc. Software
risk management concentrates on developing a product with better quality attributes such
as security, reliability, performance, .. etc. and the uncertainty associated with the product
development. It helps project managers in avoiding unpredicted catastrophic problems.
Also, it prevents wrong allocation of resources and taking decisions without proper
knowledge or adequate information on anticipated future consequences [48]. To manage
software development projects, managers and developers should rely on processes,
methods and tools to facilitate assessment, prioritization and mitigation of various risk
aspects. Therefore, risk assessment is an essential part in the management of software
development.
In this research effort, our focus will be on the security-based risk assessment of
software architecture. Security-based risk takes into account the probability that the
software product will fail in the security and the consequences of that failure. In other
words, the risk will take into account the probability of security failure based on attackability and the results of attack-ability on a software system.

1.2 Background:
This dissertation is related to the security area in the field of software engineering.
The main theme works around security-based assessment for software architecture
modeling using Unified Modeling Language (UML), and Attach Graphs. The following
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sections give a basic background on the recent work in software architecture, unified
modeling language, software security.

1.2.1 Software Architecture:
Abstracting the software system to highest level obtains us its architecture. As the
size and the complexity of the software systems increase, the need for structuring and
organizing it into components and connectors increases. As a result, the discourse of
software system’s architecture becomes essential [48]. Software architecture is the
centerpiece of modern system development [55]. The goal of architecture-centric
development is the effective, efficient, competitive development of software products.
The goal of software architecture is an important asset because of the following:



The architecture can be used for communication purposes, as it provides an
understandable abstraction by stakeholders, not only software developers but also users
and managers.



Early in the development process of new software, architecture can be available for early
analysis of the system’s properties.



For the evolution of existing systems, they can be analyzed at the architectural level to
provide a foundation for further development.
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1.2.2 The Unified Modeling Language
As software systems become more complex, modeling them to guide
development or to help secure becomes essential. System models are used to document
the analysis and design and to communicate the system artifacts among the developing
and security teams. Therefore, to have a modeling language standard is an important
factor for the success of an application development. The Unified Modeling Language
UML has become the de-facto standard for building Object-Oriented software. UML
unified the efforts of [3] [45][23] [56]. That effort has matured into UML becoming an
OMG (Object Management Group) standard [40]. Adopting UML as a standard is
motivated by:



It is programming languages independent.



It provides a rich language for visual modeling to develop and communicate
meaningful models.



It integrates lots of efforts over the years and blends many models developed.



It provides the means to extend and specializes the core concepts.

1.2.1.1 UML Definition:
According to OMG specification: [40]
"The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a graphical language for visualizing, specifying,
constructing, and documenting the artifacts of a software-intensive system. The UML offers a
standard way to write a system's blueprints, including conceptual things such as business
processes and system functions as well as concrete things such as programming language
statements, database schemas, and reusable software components."
4

[17] Fowler defines UML as a family of graphical notations, backed by single
meta model in describing and designing software systems, particularly software systems
built using the object oriented (OO).

It is important to note that UML is a 'language' for specifying and not a procedure
or method. The UML is used to define a software system; to detail the system artifacts, to
document and construct. It is the language that the blueprint is written in. The UML may
be used in a variety of ways to support a software development methodology but in itself
it does not specify that methodology or process.
1.2.1.2 UML Models
A single model cannot capture static and dynamic system properties. The models
used influence how to tackle the problem and how to come up with an appropriate
solution. Therefore, complex systems should be analyzed by examining independent
views. Static models define the static architecture of the system. They are used to model
the elements that make up a system - the classes, objects, interfaces and physical
components. Furthermore, they are used to model the relationships and dependencies
among the elements of the system. Class diagrams, Package diagrams, Component
diagrams, and Deployment diagrams are some of the static views of the system. Dynamic
models define the interaction among the system elements to accomplish a system
behavior. They contain events, responses, messages, and invocations. Use-Cases,
Scenario and Collaboration diagrams, and State-charts diagrams are some of the dynamic
views of the system. The following summarizes the modeling diagrams supported by
UML [56]:
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Use Case diagrams: describe the boundary and interaction between the system and
users. They conform in some regards to a requirements model. A use case designates
a situation in which the system is used. It defines the system inputs, actions and
possible outputs. Use cases are analyzed to construct possible scenarios.



Class diagrams: A class diagram defines the basic building blocks of a model: the
types, classes and general materials that are used to construct a full model. They
depict possible classes and their relationships. Details of the design are communicated
through detailed class diagrams, which include the attributes and the methods of the
classes.



Package diagrams: are used to divide the model into logical containers or 'packages'
and describe the interactions between them at a high level.



Behavior diagrams: capture the varieties of interaction and instantaneous state within
a model as it 'executes' over time.



State-chart diagram: State-charts are used to model the behavior of complex systems.



State charts describe the states or conditions that classes assume over time



Interaction diagrams: They include sequence diagrams and collaboration diagrams
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Sequence diagrams: show the sequence of messages passed among objects using a
vertical timeline. A sequence diagram reflects a scenario of interactions in the system
to manifest a use case of the system. Normally, there are one or more scenarios for
each use-case.



Collaboration diagrams: is another view of scenarios. They show the network and
sequence of messages between objects at run-time during a collaboration instance.



Component diagram: are used to model higher level or more complex structures,
usually built up from one or more classes, and providing a well-defined interface.



Deployment diagram: show the physical disposition of significant artifacts within a
real-world setting. Deployment diagrams are related to component diagrams in that a
node typically encompasses one or more components.

1.2.3 Software Security
According to IEEE journal [33], software security is defined as follows:
“Software security is the idea of engineering software so that it continues to function
correctly under malicious attack. Most technologists acknowledge this undertaking’s
importance, but they need some help in understanding how to tackle it.”
Security could be built at all levels and more specifically should be integrated at the
design and architecture level. At the design and architecture level, a system must define a
unified security architecture that takes into account security features (access rights).
7

Architects must clearly document assumptions and identify possible attacks on the systems
and security risk analysis is a mandatory.
Software security is to build secure software, design secure software, and educate
software developers, architects, and users how to build secure things. It is the process of
designing, building, and testing software for security by identifying and problems in the
software itself and that consequently will allow the software security practitioners to build
and use software that can resist attacks proactively.
There are many reasons why software security must be part of a full lifecycle
approach; one important reason is to consider security as an emergent property of software
system. A secure problem will show up because of a problem in a standard-issue part of the
system.

1.2.4 Security- Based Risk Assessment:
Risk assessment is an essential part in the management of software development.
Performing it in the early phases of software development can enhance allocation of
resources within the software lifecycle. Also, it provides useful means for identifying
potentially troublesome software components that require careful development and
allocation of more testing effort. We are concerned with security-based risk of a software
architecture, which takes into account the probability of the software security failure and
the consequences of that failure.
Popstojanova [43] proposes a methodology for risk assessment using UML
specifications such as use cases, sequence diagrams, and states diagrams that can be used
in the early phases of the software life cycle. The risk methodology used in that paper
depends entirely on the analytical methods by explaining two real life examples. UML
8

sequence diagrams are used to estimate the components and connectors dynamic risk
factors. Then discrete Time Markov Chain is built for estimation of each scenario risk
factor.
Manadhata [32] introduces the notion of a software systems’ attack surface and
present a systematic way to measure it. The attack surface measurement method in this
paper is analogous to the common risk estimation method. However the authors use the
systems resources (Methods, Channels, and Data) and damage-effort potential to estimate
the attack surface measurement on a system. In this paper, a couple of real life scenarios
have been used to measure the attack surface. Their approach applied on the small
desktop applications and large enterprise systems implemented in C and Java.
Howard [22] introduces a metric to compare if one system is more secure than
other systems with respect to a fixed set of dimensions. Howard el. counts the system
attack opportunities in terms of three dimensions (targets and enablers, channels and
protocols, and access rights). They call their metric “attackability”.
Feng [14] proposes a flexible approach by building attack graphs, and they use the
graph to measure security of crucial resources in the network. Their approach represents
the network as a graph with a set of nodes and edges. They set one node as a goal node
and they calculate the risk on that node by computing probabilities that lead to the goal
node.
1.2.4.1 Probability of security failure:
Risk is defined as combination of probability of malfunction (failure) and the
consequence of that malfunction (severity). During the early phases of the software life
cycle, it is difficult to estimate the probability of security failure of software components,
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however knowing that the components and connectors are sources of vulnerabilities, we use
attack graphs as a probabilistic argument to estimate the probabilities of security failures. The
Exploited messages conveyed over the connectors. And the intermediate components could
be the path to reach to the goal component.
1.2.4.2 Severity of security failure:
Traditional software fault detection models do not take int account the fact that
the consequences of various software failures caused by faults can be very different [5].
Thus, they are of limited use in the allocation of resources to the portions of a system
with the greatest risk. Since software failures have different consequences, any measure
of software fault proneness must include the measurement of the consequence of failure
[13]. Since software failures have different consequences [52] any measure of software
security risk must include the measurement of the consequence of failure.

1.3 Dissertation Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: in chapter 2, we present the
problem statement, research objectives and contributions. We discuss the related work in
chapter 3. Chapter 4 addresses the proposed methodology to estimate the probability of
security failure, the severity of security failure, and the security risk factors. We also present
our case study in Chapter 4 where we apply our proposed algorithms. In Chapter 5, we
address the validation and verification criterion. Chapter 6 concludes the work and discusses
the future research.
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Chapter 2
Problem Statement and Research
Objectives
2.1 Problem Statement:
Integrating security in the early stages of software system yet today does not find
an appropriate consideration in the practice of software developers. Little time and effort
are devoted to this aspect during the software development process and a “fix-it-later”
approach is still dominant. This allows software products to obey to the “short time to
market” law, but their security, as the ability to meet non-functional requirements, suffers
of continuous (and sometime unaffordable) product updates after delivery. The resources,
time, and cost spent in the after implementation phase to fix the security issues are
increasingly significant.
This lack of validation appears even more serious if we consider that the security
software and the software world have been rapidly going, in the last few years, towards
component-based system configurations. Security of self-contained software components
(either previously developed or acquired from other companies/teams) is changing the
software development process.
Among non-functional attributes, a little significance has been given to software
security risk. Wherever software plays a role of control in systems whose security
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failures may be costly and severe for real life systems and real life productions
businesses, the consequences of software security failures are better to be considered
from the very early phases of the lifecycle. However, quantification of software security
risk is also suitable in other domains (independently of an absolute risk level), in order to
detect components and events that may typically put in trouble the software system and
the environment where the system will be running.
The risk of a software security product can be defined as a combination of the
likelihood of a security failure and severity of “damages” that the security failure may
produce. The sources of security failures are usually software security faults, intended as
security behaviors that do not meet security requirements.
In this research we identify the following problem


How to define practical security-based risk assessment methodologies that capture
the vulnerabilities and attacks on the software elements based on quantitative
measurements rather than qualitative ones that are used in the current risk
assessment.
•

Estimate the probability of security failures for components.

•

Estimate the severity of security failures components.

•

Calculate the security risk factors of software elements.

2.2 Research Objectives
In order to improve and control the quality of the software during the software
development process, software developers need methodologies to support software
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design. Early security risk assessment based on UML models is an important and helpful
tool for managers as well as software engineers and could help them effectively
improving system security, and reducing the cost significantly on the short and long term,
and reducing security-based risk assessment should be well integrated into the software
development. Anticipating what might go wrong and managing potential security risks
should be considered into the early software development process. Security-based risk
assessment is capable of pinpointing the risky components in a system and helping in
mitigating these risks. We are concerned with security-based risk taking into
consideration of use-case relationships, attack-ability by exploiting the system’s
vulnerabilities on the components and connectors.
As the need for software systems expands, development methodologies and
techniques to the production of software and facilitate its security is needed. Researches,
businesses, and governments look for techniques that reduce security cost and improve
software system quality. Integrating security into other software attributes at the early
stages of software life cycle is significant not only for quality of the software, but also for
data and information of the customers, end users, consumers, and enterprise companies
who handle sensitive customer information.
Our objective is to develop security risk assessment methodology based on
attributes and parameters that could be collected and analyzed in the early software
design phase using UML artifacts.
The objectives of this research are:
 Develop architectural level security risk assessment methodology based on
measurable parameters that could be collected and analyzed in the early software
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design phase based on UML artifacts. We should be able to transform security risk
assessment into a structured problem with systematic solutions and quantitative
approach to estimate the security risk of software elements.

2.3 Research Contribution
This dissertation introduces a new approach for security-based risk assessment
methodology at the software architectural level.
 We develop a methodology to estimate the probability of security failures for the
software elements in a given scenario and given use case based on the UML
specifications and attack graphs.
 We develop a methodology to estimate the severity of security failures based on the
data classification, access rights, and reachability matrix for each element in the
software architecture.
 We propose data sensitivity analysis as an essential indicator to classify the software
components in the severity analysis.
 We calculate the security risk factors of every element of software architecture in a
given scenario.
 We apply the proposed methodologies on an ecommerce scenario case study.
 We use design security patterns to validate the proposed methodologies on the
architectural level and apply them on Microsoft Security Bulletins.
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Chapter 3
Literature Review
This chapter discusses previous related work in software security threat modeling,
surface attack metrics, attack graphs and security risk assessment. It draws distinctions
between prior work and the proposed research.

3.1 Software Security metric and security threat
modeling:
In Oxford’s American Dictionary, a metric is “a system or standard of
measurement”. In mathematics and physics, it is “a binary function of topological space
that gives, for any two points of the space, a value equal to the distance between them, or
to a value treated as analogous to distance for the purpose of analysis. “
Software metrics offer a means to understand the process and product of the
software [62]. It is necessary for software quality control [16]. The most important and
significant benefit of software metrics is to provide information to support managerial
decision making during the software lifecycle. In his research, Shyam [53] recommended
that the use of various well-constructed metrics could be a basis for managerial decision
making and could provide insight into the software design process. Our focus is on
software security metrics.
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Software security metrics is an area of computer security that has been receiving a
good deal of attention lately. It is not a new topic, but one which receives focused interest
sporadically. Much of what has been written about security metrics is definitional, aimed
at providing guidelines for defining a security metric and specifying criteria for which to
strive. Software security metrics are seen as an important factor in making sound
decisions about various aspects of security, ranging from the design of security
architectures and controls to the effectiveness and efficiency of security operations. In
Our research, we use software security metric to estimate the severity of security failures.
The importance of software security has been clear since most attacks discovered
on real software are triggered by weak designed and developed software
[59][20][21][54]. It has been clear that the earlier we incorporate security in a software
system, the better this would be in terms of efforts and cost [59] [34].
Bowles [4] introduced a concept of threat effect analysis and applied Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis (FEMA) to model computer security threats. They showed that
the security attacks on systems and software have grown significantly. For examples the
number of security incidents reported has grown from 1988 (less than a thousand) to
2003 (140 K). They classified the threats into three categories: Confidential threats,
Integrity threats, and availability threats. Their approach provided a framework for
modeling threats to the operation of a computer system. The systematic process dubbed
“Threat Effects Analysis” analyzes the system, classifies threats, identifies threats,
determines threat effects, and applies changes to minimize risk. In his research, he has
not estimated the probabilities and security failures of system components, and he has not
worked on the architectural level. In our research we model the attacks on the system
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using attack graphs and UML, and we estimate the two components of the risk factor
(probability, and severity).
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [24] provided an
overview of the security metrics area and looked at potential research that could be
followed to advance the start of the art. It explains how important security metrics are in
making decisions about security, starting from requirements and specifications, to the
effectiveness and efficiencies of security implementation and maintenance. Our research
agrees with our goals that the security is significant and should be taken as early as the
requirement and design phase of software life cycle.
SANS institute also has provided a very useful paper covering all the basics
aspects of security metrics [41]. It mentions how other research distinguishes between
low-level metrics based on well-ordered low-level quantitative system parameters, and
higher-level metrics such as conformity distance, attack graph or attack surface
estimations [18].
Additionally, Meland [35] presents SODA (a Security-Oriented Software
Development Framework), where the main goal is to create a system of practical
techniques and tools for creating secure software with a special focus on the early phases
of the development lifecycle. The authors have created a tool called SODAWeb that
adapts security techniques, filters information and recommends and explains further use
of tools during development. Their tool has not been used in the early phases of software
life cycle. Their tool has not estimated the probabilities and severities of security failures.
Furthermore, Heyman [19] has presented the method of using security patterns to
combine security metrics. The approach described integrates metrics in the development
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cycle of secure applications, by associating them to patterns. Their approach did not
estimate the security risk factors at any level, whereas our approach specifically estimates
the risk factors of software architecture components. Their approach explained the idea of
security patterns and security metrics. In our research we used two security patterns for
validation purposes.
Wang [60] proposed a new approach to define software security metrics based on
vulnerabilities included in the software systems and their impacts on software quality. He
used the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), an industry standard for
vulnerability and exposure names, and the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS), a vulnerability scoring system designed to provide an open and standardized
method for rating software vulnerabilities. In his technique, he has applied the standard
on the code level. This was not sufficient as we see new vulnerabilities in the code due to
weak design software. Furthermore, this could be seen on every month where big
software companies release new patches to cover the security vulnerabilities and attacks
on their software. In Wang approach, he introduced a method to qualitatively count the
number of vulnerabilities on the code level. This is not a realistic way of measuring
security attributes and very expensive to keep. Additionally, Wany’s approach is not
practical as his approach applies on the code level and every day the attackers are able to
find hundreds of unknown vulnerabilities in the system. In contrast, we estimate the
probabilities and severities of security failures for each component at the architectural
level quantitatively.
Krautsevich [28] considered several security metrics that can be used for
measuring security strength, and this metric is defined by number of attacks, minimal
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cost of attack, shortest length of attack, maximal probability of attack, overall probability
of success, attack surface metric, and percentage of compliance. However in his
approach, he has not estimated the probabilities of security failure and has not calculated
the risk factors. Furthermore, his analysis was not based on measuring absolute security
measurements; instead it was based on compare two systems and tell which one is more
secure.
Savola [47] discussed the security metrics and how they could be used to identify
risks, and mitigate those risks. This approach is toward counting all possible attack on a
system, yet new attacks could emerge. In our approach we look at the architecture
components and connectors and we develop a methodology to draw the attacks exploited
through these components and connectors without counting all attacks.
Manadhata [32] proposed to use a software system’s attack measurement to
measure the attack surface for a software system, and this is used to mitigate the software
security risk by measuring and reducing the software attach surfaces. Their methodology
is based on the identifications of system’s resources (methods, channels, and data). They
introduced also the damage and effort ratio to measure the attackability on a system. In
their approach, they depend on counting all possible attacks through the system resource.
However, in their cases studies, they have only counted the directed attacks on a system,
not taking in consideration the indirect attacks. Furthermore, their methodology is
applicable only on the code level and after systems are development and in
implementation. In our approach, we count the direct and indirect attacks on the software
components and connectors. Our methodologies are quantitative solution rather than
qualitative one and applicable on all phases of software life cycle.
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Vaughn [57] questioned the feasibility of “measures and metrics for trusted
information systems”. According to him, metrics are possible in disciplines such as
mechanical or civil engineering because they complied with the laws of physics, which
could be used to validate the metrics. In contrast, the software engineering discipline is
not compliant with the laws of physics and faces huge challenges in establishing
correctness. Vaughn, however, suggested that effective security metrics can be defined by
accepting some risk in how they are used and by validating them in the real world
through empirical investigation and experimentation.
Fenton [15] identifies three classes of entities that are of interest of software
engineering measurement, namely products, processes and resources. Our focus is on the
security metrics at the software product level.
Jaquith [25] explains how security metrics help organizations understand security
risks, spot emerging problems, understand weaknesses in the security infrastructures, and
recommend technology and process improvements. In our research, our goal is to identify
the security risk on system by estimating the security failures at early stages of software
life cycle and by pointing out the high risk components.
Liu [29] introduced software security metrics to guide development process in the
field of software products, and that includes internal software attributes that could be
related to a variety of security qualities. It is clear to note that the internal attributes
suggested in this paper cover only a limited view of software security. In our research, we
show that the attacker could exploit vulnerabilities through the messages, connectors, and
components without the need to know and identify all possible internal attributes.
Security is considered part of the software attributes like reliability, performance, and
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maintainability. However attacks on a system could come without knowing the internal
attributes of the software, like time and other factors. Exploiting vulnerabilities in any
architecture could happen through exploiting the resources of the system like messages,
components. In our research, we show how the attack could reach certain component by
exploiting certain messages that connect the system to the actors.
Sahinoglu [46] proposed a security measurement based on the decision tree based
model’s attribute to quantify risk using the threats, vulnerabilities and countermeasures to
calculate the risk. In his approach he assumes the probabilities of vulnerabilities and
threats are given and known, and he does not estimate the risk components and
connectors in the system. In contrast, our research develops methodologies to estimate
the risk factor of components like probabilities and severities and security risk factors for
all components in a given scenario and a given use case. Our approach is quantitative
whereas Sahinoglu’s approach is qualitative. Furthermore, our approach is applied on the
architectural level, whereas his approach is not.
Madan [31] presented an approach for quantification assessment of security
attributes for an intrusion tolerant system using a state transition model. Their method did
not estimate the risk factors of the components in that system. It showed only how system
could transition to different states in case of security failures. This approach did not
measure the risk factors of the system components and connectors. In our approach we
specifically estimate the probabilities and severities of security failures for each
component based on mathematical analysis.
Sharma [49] presented a hierarchical approach for predicting security attributes of
software system based on its software architecture and the components attributes using
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DTMC. They introduced the Vulnerability index (VI) of a system. However this paper
does not estimate the probability of security failure of the system’s components and
severity of such a failure. Furthermore, they have assumed that the severity of security
failure is known. The Focus in our research is on estimating the probabilities and severity
of security failures at early stages of software life cycle based on UML specifications
given the fact that UML artifacts have been used as foundations to estimate different
types of risks.
Chen [8] presented Threat Modeling using Attack Path Analysis (T-MAP) to
measure software system security by calculating the total severity weights of attack paths.
They used the UML class diagram to model the steps in an Attack Path. In their
approach, they don’t measure the potential security failure of software architecture. TMAP method requires comprehensive, accurate and up-to-date vulnerability information.
Their approach needs a big database in order to calculate weights. In our approach, we
estimate the risk factors based on the software elements that form the architecture of that
system. Knowing the components and connectors and communication between the
system and outside world would help estimate the probabilities and severities of software
elements. UML specifications provide us with enough information about the software
elements through the UML sequence diagrams, state diagrams, use cases, and scenarios.
Chen’s approach is applicable on code level and can’t be used to estimate risk at the
architectural level. Additionally, their approach is qualitative solution and is expensive to
keep up as we see and hear new unknown types of attacks
Neuhaus [39] has showed that some systems’ features are correlated with
vulnerabilities on the code level. They have conducted empirical study on Mozilla code
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base. Their approach depends on the history to predict the future vulnerabilities. This
analysis is only valid on the code level and reactive approach after the system is built.
However, our approach is proactive and applicable on the design and architectural level
in order to identify any possible attacks on the software elements.
Lund [30] showed the need to a UML language to model security assessment in
IT systems. UML used in modeling threats, vulnerabilities, risk estimate, modeling
treatments, and evaluating the treatment. Our research agrees of integrating the UML at
early phases of software life cycle for risk analysis. Our methodologies use the UML
specification as the first reference to estimate the probabilities of security failures. Lund
has not estimated the probabilities of security failures. We however in our research
estimate the probabilities and severities of security failure for every component at the
architectural level. Our methodology shows in analytical way and based on probabilistic
analysis the path of attacks on the components and it shows the high risk components.

3.2 Surface Attack Metric:
Security attacks on a system happen through data exchange or communication
from attackers with that system more specifically that can happen by sending data and or
receiving data from the system. In either way, an attacker can connect to the system using
systems entry or exit point, or execute actions, send data or receive data from the system.
We define here the systems resources to be methods (actions), data, and means to execute
these methods and receive/send data from/to that system. On the architectural level, these
resources will be represented as components, connectors, and messages. Components
have a list of messages that can be executed, connectors that convey the data and
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messages between the components and or external entities (attackers), and data is to be
transferred and handled by the components and external entities (attackers). The system’s
attack surface consists of the combination of the systems actions externally visible to the
users and the resources accessed or modified by these actions. The more actions or
resources are available to the users, the more exposed the system is to successful attacks,
and so the more insecure it is.
Manadhata [32] used I/O Automation representation to represent a system s and
its environment, and defined the entry points, exit points, schedule, methods, channels,
and untrusted data that would help define the attack surface. Additionally, they defined a
damage potential and effort ratio to determine the severity of attack surface.

Manadhata and Wing took a conservative approach by assuming the probability
of vulnerabilities coming from methods, channels, or untrusted data is 1 and they use the
damage effort ratio to obtain the severity of the attack on the system using the damage
effort ratio (methods, channels, and untrusted data). And yet the authors are
implementing their approach on a system that is already in the implementation or
production phase. In our approach we will introduce a methodology that will help us
evaluate the probability of security failure based on attack-ability considering the
architectural level UML analysis and the early phases of software life cycle. Their
approach offered security measurement based on the number of resources the system is
using in communication with the outside environment. Their approach applies on the
implementation phase regardless of technologies. However, their approach agrees with
the current and other approaches that depend on reactive patching and change the code
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criteria. This criteria still does not offer a fundamental solution that would help the
industries to save money and resources to the companies. In our research, we developed
our methodologies based on the UML specifications. UML specifications are clear to
identify the system architecture and show how the components are coupled with each
other and how the system is connected to the outside world. Our approach takes the risk
from early stages of software life cycle, where as I/O automaton approach takes the risk
at late stages of software life cycle. Furthermore, we develop a methodology to estimate
the probability of security failure of every component in the system, whereas their
approach considers the probability equals 1. In our approach we present a quantitative
approach to estimate the severity of security failure in certain scenario based on data
sensitivity, access rights, and reachability matrix. However their approach presents
incomplete qualitative approach by counting only the direct attacks on the system.
Changing the code level and adding patches to the system would make even their
approach more difficult to evaluate the attackability on a system. In contrast, adding
security patterns on the design level would make the process clearer and easier to reevaluate the risks of components since we depend on the attack graphs and UML
specifications.
Howard [33] proposed an Attackability metric to measure and compare the
security of two systems using three dimensions targets and enablers, channels and
protocols, and access rights. Their approach implemented on production systems (code
level) using a state machine model. Their measurement of attackability does not identify
the risky components in a system; it is more toward comparing two systems and
determines which system is more secure than the other. Howard’s approach is qualitative
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solution whereas our approach is quantitative. Additionally, our methodologies are used
at the architectural level, whereas Howard approach is used at the code level. In our
approach we identify the components with high security risks and that would help the
developers and designer build and add more secure layers to these components. Whereas
in Howard’s approach; he looked at the system as one entity without pointing out the
high risky pieces. In conclusion, our approach is much less expensive and practical to use
than Howard’s approach.

3.3 Attack Graphs:
An attack graph is a graph to represent our architectural system in a set of nodes
(condition nodes, initial nodes, exploit nodes, and goal nodes) and edges. The nodes
represent the vulnerabilities, and edges represent the paths. These nodes have certain
probabilities. The exploit nodes are the messages carried over connectors. The attack
graph is a mathematical model to represent how the attacker can reach certain destination
in the system and cause a security failure in terms of attackability on the components or
connectors.
Jha [26] presented a security analysis using attack graph for attack detection,
defense and forensics. They presented a way to produce an attack graph. Their cases
studies applied only on the production and late phase of software life cycles, whereas our
approach considers the system at the architectural level. Feng [14] proposed an approach
based on attack graph to measure security of critical components in a network. Attack
graph is a set of condition nodes and exploit nodes. They used probabilities to calculate
security risk. However they have not taken in the account the severity and they assigned
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values to the exploits nodes probabilities. In our research these exploits nodes
probabilities will be estimated and calculated based on the architecture resources
extracted from UML sequence diagram. In our research the attacks are initiated through
the contact points between the actors and our system components. Their approach
depends on knowing the protocols, every single user, and every single machine that are
used in the network. In our research, we focus on the UML specifications of the system
where UML shows the components and connectors and the messages carried between
components without the need to know all protocols. Furthermore, Feng doesn’t consider
scenario and use cases analysis. Consequently, their approach is not practical for big
systems with thousands of machines. In contrast, our methodologies depend on use cases
and scenarios and less expensive to adopt. Furthermore, we estimate the risk factors of
system components, whereas Feng’ approach did not estimate the risk factors in terms of
probabilities and severity.

3.4 Security Risk Assessment:
Aagedal [1] introduced a Consultative Objective Risk Analysis System (CORAS)
approach to conduct risk assessment of security for critical systems. They proposed
models for each step in the risk process. In their approach, they have mentioned that
UML graphical style would help speed up risk analysis. In our research we build our
methodologies based on UML specifications and consider these specifications as the
foundation to estimate the risk factors. CORAS approach explains the risk assessment
from management perspective without estimating the risk factors of system, components,
and scenarios. In contrast, we build a mathematical model based on UML, attack graph,
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and other factors to estimate the risk factors parts (probabilities and severities) of every
component in the system in a given scenario and a given use case.
Dimitrakos [12] introduced a CORAS framework for model based risk assessment
and apply their methodology on web-based application. Their approach was applied on a
system (late phase of software cycle) without estimating any risk values (likelihood,
consequences) of a system.
Lund [30] showed the need to a UML language to model security assessment in
IT systems. UML used in modeling threats, vulnerabilities, risk estimate, modeling
treatments, and evaluating the treatment. In their approach they explained the risk process
from the management point without estimating the two parts of security risk factors,
whereas our approach takes into the account estimating the probabilities and severities of
every component in the system based on mathematical and probabilistic approach. Our
approach is applicable on the system at early stages of software lifecycle.

3.5 Summary:
This Literature review indicates the absence of research for early security risk
assessment of software architecture. All previous works did not estimate the risk
assessment in terms of probabilities and severity on the architectural level. They rather
discussed the risk assessment management process on the late phases of software
lifecycles. This literature review indicates that there is a need for new methodology for
security risk assessment of software architecture. It motivates us also to explore the attack
graph based on the UML artifacts. All previous work showed a lack in determining the
risk components on the early phases of lifecycle, they have only focused on patch
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management and reactive security supports on maintenance phases that would cover the
defects in the software systems. Previous work has focused only on counting all possible
vulnerabilities that could be in a system; however this qualitative way was not practical
as new vulnerabilities merge every day, and it is an expensive way of evaluating security
on a system as it consumes a lot of resources without really estimating the security risk
factors of the system or the elements in that system. In our methodologies, we identify
high security risk components at early phases of software life cycle, so extra efforts could
be added to make sure security patterns are planted with the risky components.
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Chapter 4
Proposed Techniques and
Methodologies
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we illustrate the proposed security risk algorithms. We then describe
the probability of security failure methodology and the severity of security failure in a given
scenario. We calculate the security risk factors. We apply the proposed algorithm on a case
study (ecommerce example).

4.2 Security Based Risk Assessment:
In this section, we introduce our security risk assessment methodology by explaining
each step of the algorithm. The proposed methodology is based on uses cases and scenarios.
In a given use case and given scenario, we estimate the probability and severity of security
failures for each element in the system. We will use the UML sequence diagram as the first
reference where it shows the messages exchanged between the components and the time lines
of the execution. A sequence diagram in Unified Modeling Language (UML) is a kind of
interaction diagram that shows how processes operate with one another and in what order. It
is a construct of a Message Sequence Chart. A sequence diagram shows object interactions
arranged in time sequence. It depicts the objects and classes involved in the scenario and the
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sequence of messages exchanged between the objects needed to carry out the functionality of
the scenario. Sequence diagrams typically are associated with use case realizations in the
Logical View of the system under development. Sequence diagrams are sometimes called
event diagrams, event scenarios, and timing diagrams. In our research, UML sequence
diagrams show how the external actors communicate with our system through messages and
how the system components are interacting with each other through messages. Figure 4- 2
shows the proposed algorithm.


The system is represented as a group of UML use cases, and each use case is realized
with one or more independent scenarios.



Each scenario is represented with a UML sequence diagram where it shows a number of
components and messages exchanged between them.
– Extract the components, connectors, and schedules directly from the UML
sequence diagram
– For each component in the scenario, we do the following:
 Extract the messages and paths to develop the attack graph. The attack
graph for each component shows the paths an attacker could exploit to
reach and cause security breach.
 Apply the attack graph probability equations to estimate the probability of
security failure.
 Estimate the severity of security failure based on the component
classification, Access rights and reachability Matrix.
 Calculate the security risk factor after estimating the two parts of the risk
factor.
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– Sort the components based on the security risk factors values in the scenario.
We present an ecommerce application to illustrate the steps of our methodology.
We choose a typical scenario that allows customers, attackers, or administrators to
communicate with the system. In such an application, security attacks could easily
happen with significant damages such as loss of customer data records. Figure 4- 6 shows
the Sequence Diagram for a buy a book scenario. In the following subsection 4.2.1, we
present the methodology of estimating the probability of security failure. Then in
subsection 4.2.2, we present the methodology of estimating the severity of security
failure. In subsection 4.2.3, we estimate components risk factors.

4.2.1 Probability of Security Failure
In this section, we describe the process of estimating the probability of security
failure for each element based on the UML sequence diagrams and attack graphs. We
describe the methodology of developing the attack graph for each component from a given
UML sequence diagram. Then we use probabilistic arguments to estimate the probability of
security failure for that component. We first define the attack graphs as follows. The Attack
Graph [14] can be represented as a Tuple:

(1)

1-

is a set of initial nodes. The initial nodes are the initial contact points where the
attacker initiates the attack. They are subset of the actors where the attackers
impersonate the actors.
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2-

is a set of exploit nodes. They represent the messages between the actors and
the system or messages between the components. The attacker exploits these
messages in order to reach to other elements in the system.

3-

is a set of intermediate nodes. The Intermediate nodes are the components of
the system where that attacker uses to reach to the goal component.

is the goal

node. It represents the goal component.
4-

is a set of edges between nodes (conditions and exploits).

Figure 4- 1 shows a simple attack graph.

{

}

{

}

{

}

Eprob( ) denotes the exploit success probability of t . It is the probability of
exploiting a message . For the direct messages between actors and the system, this should be
inputs to the algorithm. For the messages between components inside the system, the
algorithm will estimate them based on the reachability matrix.
Cprob( ) denotes the condition obtained probability of component . It represents the
probability of reaching component . For the initial nodes set, Cprob(c) will be input to our
algorithm. For intermediate and goal nodes, the algorithm will generate the values of
Cprob(c).
Oprob( ) denotes the successful occurrence probability of exploit t. It represents the
probability of successful exploitation of a message coming from components

.

The following algorithm will generate it.
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Figure 4- 1: an example of an attack graph {
the set of intermediate nodes,

} is set of initial nodes. { } is

goal node, {

} set of exploit nodes
(2)

K is the number of condition or initial connected directly to exploit node t.
∑

(3)

N is the number of exploits nodes connecting to component c.
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 For each use case
 For each scenario
 Identify components, connectors, schedules from UML sequence
diagram
 For each component


Identify the messages, data, connectors related to that
component



Build the attack graph



Estimate the probability of security failure from attack graph



Estimate severity of security failure based on component
classification, Access rights, and Reachability Matrix



Calculate risk factor

 Sort the list of components risk factors

Figure 4- 2 The security risk analysis algorithm

Node c is an intermediate component or goal component. Where

are the messages

reaching component c.
The following steps describe the proposed methodology to develop the attack graph
based on UML sequence diagram:
1. Choose a component as a goal node.
2. Extract the initial set

from the UML sequence diagram.

{

}

where m represents the number of the total direct messages exchanged between the
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system and outside world. We assume there is one attack on the system through one
of these initial nodes. We assume all initial nodes have equal initial probabilities, and
we consider that we have 8 malicious users initiating the attacks from 8 different
points of contacts. In this situation we are considering the most general scenario (8
attackers).
(4)
VI [49] denotes the Vulnerability Index (VI). Vulnerability Index is defined as the
number of successful attacks on the system to the total number of attacks. The value
of VI is determined by domain experts. In equation 4, we assumed that all initial
points have the same initial probabilities. We refer to section 5.3.2 in chapter 5 to
discuss the validity of this assumption.
3. Extract a partial set

of exploit nodes set T (

).

{

}

represents the set of direct messages exchanged between the external actors and the
system. For simplicity, we assume all these external messages have equally likely
distribution, and we will be discussing various possible cases in chapter 5. We will
apply the same methodologies on the new cases where we show maximum risk
factors under the cases in the validation studies chapter. The following assumption in
equation 5 is considered only for simplicity reason even it assumes lower estimate of
risk factors as it will show in chapter 5.

(5)
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4. Extract a partial set of the intermediate condition nodes. These represent the
components in our system connected to the external actors through set

.

5. Extract a partial set of exploit nodes set that represents the internal messages
produced by components in step 4.
6. Repeat step 5 and 6 above until we include all internal messages and internal
components that lead to the goal node.
7. From UML sequence diagram, we extract the schedules [32]. A schedule is defined as
a sequence of messages executed to do a certain process. These schedules will help
count the effect of one message on a component only once.
Form the reachability Matrix M. Elements in Matrix M represent the numbers of
exchanged messages between every two components in a given scenario.

is the number of

messages leaving component 1 and entering component n.
[

]

Figure 4- 3 shows the tree diagram of a component j in a given scenario that describes
the above steps.
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Choose a component

Direction
connection

yes

Estimate probability of security failure from the direct
messages between system and outside world

No

Connection
with component i

yes

Check Reachability Matrix and
Schedules

Estimate probability of security failure
coming from component i

Connection
with component i-1

yes

Check Reachability Matrix and
Schedules

Estimate probability of security failure
coming from component i-1

Connection
with component 2

yes

Connection
with component 1

yes

Check Reachability Matrix and
Schedules

Check Reachability Matrix and
Schedules

Estimate probability of security failure
coming from component 2

Estimate probability of security failure
coming from component 1

Figure 4- 3 Tree Diagram for a component j

4.2.2 Severity of Security Failure
In this section, we consider the severity of consequences of security failure. Our
approach takes into the account the severity related to each component in the software
architecture. Our approach depends on how the security failure for each element is impacting
the system. Severity of security failure for certain element should consider the worst case
consequence of such failures. Pfleeger [18] discusses the three common categories of impact
that could affect elements’ confidentiality, Integrity and availability. From the three
categories, we come up with two classifications of architectural components. One is a
database component category, and the second is non-database component category. The
reason behind this classification is the intent of the attacker to get as much information as
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possible. One of the hacker’s main goals is to steal as much data as he or she can. For
example, [9] shows that hackers could have access to millions of customer sensitive
information and records such as customer names, account numbers and contact information
(email addresses) were all exposed. Another example is the Sony Playstation data security
breach [10] where 77 million PlayStation accounts were stolen. The later security breach on
data included user names, passwords, users email addresses, and dates of birth. A third real
life example is shown in [58] where hackers were able to view password and other sensitive
information on the cell phones. Another incident shows the data is a goal for the attacker to
steal the data is [11], the attacker stole personal information from over 1.2 million customers
of a Japanese gaming company. The stolen information includes names, email addresses, and
encoded passwords. Another example shows that there are 540,613,790 record breaches since
2005 [64]. Therefore, it is very important to focus on the database components where
sensitive data might be stored and saved. The database components could be further
classified according to their sensitivity. Some database components may store high sensitive
records that could lead to a full access to the system. Some database components may store
information that leads to no other components in the architecture. In our algorithm we take
this in our consideration where the higher sensitive information is stored in the database, the
higher severity we expect. In our analysis, we test the access rights when accessing the
database component; we find the higher the access rights, the more sever when the security
failure occurs. The non-database components can be classified into two types, one has a
direct connection with a database component and offer services to it and consequently has the
same level of severity of that database component. The second type does not connect directly
to a database component and we check the reachability. We identify five severity levels.
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•

Catastrophic: A security failure could cause security breach to the whole

system and whole database (all records).
•

Critical: A security failure could cause security breach to the whole

system (one record) or two database components (all records).
•

Major: A security failure could cause security breach to one database

component (all records) or two database components (one record).
•

Minor: A security failure may cause security breach to one database

component (one record) or security breach to non-database component with high
reachability.
•

Low: A security failure may cause security breach to non-database

component with low reachability.
Values of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are assigned to low, minor, major, critical, and catastrophic
levels respectively.
Figure 4- 4 describes the steps to estimate the impact on the system when security
failures occur.
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For each component


If the component is a database element
o Check data sensitivity


Assign severity based on data sensitivity (Critical =high sensitive, Major=
medium sensitive, Minor= low sensitive)



Else // component is not a database element
o if the component has a direct connection with a database component


Assign database component severity to the non-database component

o Else// no direct connection with database


Assign severity based on reachability (Minor= high reachable, Low = low
reachable)



Check Access rights of the component


If (Access rights == admin)




Increase severity level by one level

Normalize the component’s severity

Figure 4- 4 The security severity analysis algorithm

4.2.3 Security Risk Factors
In this section, we calculate the risk factor for each component in a given scenario
based on the probability of security failure and severity of security failure using the following
equation:
rf(c)=Prob(c)*Severity(c)

(7)
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Where Prob(c) {0≤Prob(c)≤1}is the probability of security failure of a component in
a scenario, and severity (c) {0<severity (c)≤1 } is the severity level of a component in the
same scenario. After calculating the risk factors for each component in a given scenario, we
form the scenario list risk factors and sort them.

4.3 Case Study
We have selected a case study of ecommerce application to illustrate how the
proposed methodology works. Figure 4- 5 shows Ecommerce system architecture [44]. The
ecommerce application allows customers and other actors to interact with each other over the
internet. In this type of application, security attacks could easily happen with significant
damages such as loss of customer data records. The severity of security failure depends on
the type of data sensitivity and usually is different for different types of security failures.
The e-commerce system allows a customer to browse products provided by the
system, select the item to be purchased and place the order. The order is then processed by
checking that the customer has enough funds with the financial institute. The customer
during this process communicates with the system through connectors. Figure 4- 6 shows the
UML Sequence Diagram for a buy a book scenario. We show how the proposed
methodology applied using this case study as illustrative example.
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customers

Hackers

E-Commerce Information Appliances

Internal Staff, System administrators

Enterprise e commerce computing architecture

Electronic
Computing
Networks

Access
Gateways

Middleware

Data/
information
Repositories

E commerce business
domains

ECommerce
Payment
Financial
Institute

Figure 4- 5 E-commerce system architecture
Stage 1: Identify Components, connectors, and schedule in that scenario
Components:
1- Customer <<External actor>>
2- Customer Interface
3- Customer Agent
4- Delivery Agent
5- Customer information <<database>> includes customer usernames, passwords, customer
IDs, orders numbers,
6- Books server <<database>> includes the databases of all books
7- Orderserver <<database>> include Order ID, customer IDs, Addresses, order details
8- Financial Institute <<external actor>>
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Connectors:
1- Connector1: customer:: customer interface
2- Connector2: customer interface:: customer agent
3- Connector3: customer agent:: customer information
4- Connector4: customer agent:: books server
5- Connector5: customer agent:: delivery agent
6- Connector6: customer agent:: financial institute
7- Connector7: customer agent:: order server
Schedules:
1. Schedule1:Accessmainpage(){1.1}mainpage(){1.2}.
2. Schedule 2: login(username, password) {2.1} send(username, password)
{2.2} userinformationquery(username,password) {2.3} verified(){2.4}
loginconfirm(){2.5} loginconfirm(){2.6}
3. Schedule 3: buybook(book,creditcard) {3.1} buybook(book,creditcard) {3.2}
search(book)

{3.3}

reservefunds(creditcard,customerinformation)

bookavailable(){3.4}
{3.5}

fundreserved(){3.6}

generateordernumber(){3.7}orderstatus(){3.8}  orderstatus(){3.9}
4. Schedule 4: buyrequest(ordernumber, address, book) {4.1}
5. Schedule 5: writeorderdata(ordernumber, address, book) {5.1}
Stage 2: Identify the messages, data, connectors related to customer agent component
Customer agent
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1- Messages:
o Send (username, password) [read username and password from
connector2]
o userinformationquery(username,password) [read data from the database
customer information, and do inquiry in the customer information
database ]
o verified() [true if found, false otherwise-- read data from connector 3]
o search(book) [do inquiry in the book server database]
o bookavailable() [true if found, false othewise-- read data from connector4]
o generateordernumber() [internal action to generate a unique order number
for this specific scenario]
o reservefund (creditcard,customerinformation) [write data to connector 6
and send it to the financial institute, data is sent to the outside system]
o fundreserved() [true if reserved, false otherwise--- read data from
connector6]
o buyrequest(ordernumber, address, book) [write data to connector5, send it
to the internal component delivery agent]
o writeorderdata(ordernumber, address, books) [write ordernumber, address,
books information over connector 7 and send it to the orderserver
database]
o orderstatus() {send order status info to the customer interface over
connector 2}
2- Data {username, password, book, creditcard, ordernumber, customer information,}
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3- Connectors {connector2, connector3, connector4, connector5, connector6, connector7}
Stage 3: Build attack graph of customer agent component
The following steps describe the proposed methodology to develop the attack graph
based on UML sequence diagram:
1. Choose a component as a goal node. We will pick the customer agent in Figure 4- 6
as a goal node.
2. Extract the initial set
{

from the UML sequence diagram. In Figure 4- 6

} where m=8 represents the number of the total direct messages

exchanged between the system and outside world. We assume that there is an attack
on the system through one of these initial nodes. We assume all initial nodes have
equally likely distribution,
(4)
VI [49] denotes the Vulnerability Index. (VI) is defined as the number of successful
attacks on the system to the total number of attacks. The value of VI is determined by
domain experts.
3. Extract a partial set

of exploit nodes set T (

).

{

}

represents

the direct messages exchanged between the external actors and the system. If we
assume all these external messages have equally likely distribution,
(5)
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Messages

{Accessmainpage(),

Mainpage(),

login(username,password),

loginconfirm(), buy(book,creditcard), orderstatus(), reservefund(), fundreserved()}
are the exploit nodes in the set

.

4. Extract a partial set of the intermediate condition nodes. These represent the
components in our system connected to the external actors through set
the customer interface component is an intermediate node, and

. Figure 4- 6,
denotes the

customer interface component node.
5. Extract a partial set of exploit nodes set that represents the internal messages
produced by components in step 4. In Figure 4- 6, The internal messages
send(username, password) and buy(book, creditcard) are the messages produced by
the component customer interface node. In Figure 4- 7, these two messages are
(

) to the customer agent goal node.

6. Repeat the previous step 5 and 6 above until we include all internal messages and
internal components that lead to the goal node.
7. From UML sequence diagram, we extract the schedules [32]. A schedule is defined as
a sequence of messages executed to do a certain process. These schedules will help
count the effect of one message on a component only once. In the ecommerce
application, we define five schedules.
a. Schedule1:Accessmainpage(){1.1}mainpage(){1.2}.
b. Schedule 2: login(username, password) {2.1} send(username, password)
{2.2} userinformationquery(username,password) {2.3} verified(){2.4}
loginconfirm(){2.5} loginconfirm(){2.6}
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c. Schedule 3: buybook(book,creditcard) {3.1} buybook(book,creditcard)
{3.2}

search(book)

{3.3}

bookavailable(){3.4}

reservefunds(creditcard,customerinformation) {3.5} fundreserved(){3.6}
generateordernumber(){3.7}orderstatus(){3.8}  orderstatus(){3.9}
d. Schedule 4: buyrequest(ordernumber, address, book) {4.1}
e. Schedule 5: writeorderdata(ordernumber, address, book) {5.1}
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External
system

Ecommerce
system

Ecommerce
system

External
system

delivery agent
<<actor>> customer customer interface Customer agent <<database>>customer <<database>>booksserver
information

<<database>>orders server

<<actor>>Financial Institute

Access main page() 1.1
main page() 1.2

login(user name+ password) 2.1
send(user name+ password) 2.2
userinformationquery(username+password) 2.3
verified() 2.4
loginconfirm() 2.5
loginconfirm() 2.6
buy(book,creditcard) 3.1
buy(book,creditcard) 3.2
search(book) 3.3
bookavailable() 3.4
reservefunds(creditcard,customerinformation) 3.5
fundreserved() 3.6
generateordernumber() 3.7
orderstatus() 3.8
orderstatus() 3.9
buyrequest(ordernumber, address, book) 4.1
writeorderdata(ordernumber, address, books) 5.1

Figure 4- 6 UML Sequence diagram of a buy book scenario
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Stage 4: Estimate the probability of security failure of customer agent component:
After developing the attack graph for each component, we use the equations (2&3) to
estimate the probability of security failure of the goal node. Figure 4- 7 shows the attack
graph of customer agent component.

The exploits nodes (

) represent the messages send(username, password) and

buy(book, creditcard) going between the components customer interface and customer agent.
These two messages will carry over any attack coming from outside.

and

are estimated:
(6)
Where Z is the total number of messages exchanged between the two components.
Matrix MA shows the numbers of exchanged messages between every two components i, j in
our system. Figure 4- 6 shows we have 6 components, the following MA (6*6) shows
messages exchanged in this example.

[

]

=
We can estimate

as following
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Cprob(g) is the estimated probability of security failure for customer agent
component. In Figure 4- 7, we notice the higher number of internal messages between
components, the higher the probability of security failure. The attack starts initially on any
component from the touch points and carried over through the direct messages. Then the
internal messages carry such attacks further to the internal components that have no direct
connection with the external system. We can conclude the higher coupling between
components the higher probability of security failure could be. This is shown in the attack
graph through the edges that connect the exploit nodes and intermediate nodes. The higher
number of paths in the attack graph, the higher the probability of security failure. We assume
there is an attack on a system, and this attack starts off through one of the direct messages
that connect the system with the external actors. Similarly, we can estimate the probabilities
of security failures for the other components. It is important to mention that UML sequence
diagram will help us sort the messages exchanged between components based on the
execution time. The execution sequences of messages will help us detect where the attack is
coming from and when could be happening.

Table 4- 1 shows the probabilities of security

failures for each component in this specific scenario.
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Figure 4- 7 Attack Graph of customer agent component in a given scenario
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Stage 5: Estimate the severity of security failure of customer agent component:
In this stage, we estimate the severity of security failure of customer agent
component. We need first to classify this component based on the algorithm in Figure 4- 4.
This component is not a database component; however it has connections to more than a
database component. In the severity analysis, we consider always the worst consequence
when a security failure occurs. Since the customer agent component has a direct connection
with customer information database record component, we only need to estimate the severity
of the customer information database component. The customer information database keeps
the customer information such user ID, passwords, and other sensitive information. Based on
the sensitivity analysis, any security breach (unauthorized read or modify) to this data could
simply lead access to the whole system on one record or all records depending on the access
rights. We can conclude the sensitivity is high and as a result the severity is critical. However
if we consider the access right is admin, the severity even would be worse and could climb to
catastrophic level. This means the severity of customer information database is 5. After
normalizing the severity the value of customer information database component severity is 1.
Consequently, the customer agent severity is also 1. The following pseudo code is used to
estimate the severity of security failure given certain information to the code (component
classification, data sensitivity). From the UML sequence diagram, we extract the reachability
matrix, and access rights. There should be user interaction with the system where the user
will enter the data sensitivity of each component. The output of this algorithm is the severity
of each component. The UML sequence diagram provides reachability matrix, name of each
component, specification of each component.
Severity_Analysis_Code;
Vaiables;
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String Component_sensitivity[], Component_Severity[], Component_name[],
Reachability[];
Boolean isdatabasecomponent[], direct_connectionwithdatabasecomponent;
Integer i, j, numberofcomponent;
Real normalizedseverity[];
Main // begin of Main program
{
Input(numberofcomponent);//enter number of components

For (i=1,numberofcomponets,1)
Input(Component_name[i]);//enter the names of each component
For (i=1,numberofcomponets,1)// check if a component is a database component and
//assign a sensitivity value to the component
{
If (Component_name[i] is database)
{
Isdatabsecomponent[i]=1;
Component_sesnitivity[i]=Checksensitivity(Component_name[i]);
// “low”, or “medium”, or “high”
Component_Severity[i]=AssignSeverity(Component_sensitvity[i]);
}
Else
{
Isdatabsecomponent[i]=0;
Component_sesnitivity[i]=”zero”;
}

}// end of For loop
For (i=1,numberofcomponets,1)// check if a nondatabase component has a
//directionconnection with a database component
{
If (Isdatabsecomponent[i]==0)
{
direct_connectionwithdatabasecomponent[i]=checkconnection(Component_name[i])
if (direct_connectionwithdatabasecomponent[i]==1)
{
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Component_Severity[i]=Component_Severity[j];
//j
is
the
//database component index, i is the nondatabase component index that has connection with the
//database component
}
else
{
Reacability[i]=Comput_Reachability(Component_name[i]);
If (Reachability [i]>1)
Component_Severity[i]=”minor”;
Else
Component_Severity[i]=”low”;

}// end of else
}// end of if

}// end of For loop
For (i=1,numberofcomponets,1)// check the access right of a component
{
If (Component_name[i].Accessright==admin)
Component_Severtriy=IncreaseComponentseverity(Component_Severity[i]);
}
For (i=1,numberofcomponets,1)// Normalize the severity
{
Normalizedseverity[i]=Normalize(Component_Severity[i]);
}

}// end of Main program
String AssignSeverity(String st1);
{
If (st1==”low”)
Return “minor”;
Elseif (st1==”medium”)
Return “major”;
Else
Return “critical”;
}
String IncreaseComponentseverity( String st2);
{
If (st1==”low”)
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Return “minor”;
Elseif (st1==”minor”)
Return “major”;
Elseif (st1==”major”)
Return “critical”;
Elseif (st1==”critical”)
Return “catastrophic”;
}
real Normalize (String str)
{
If (str==”low”)
Return .2;
Elseif (str==”minor”)
Return .4;
Elseif (str==”major”)
Return .6;
Elseif (str==”critical”)
Return .8;
Else
Return 1;
}
Stage 6: Calculate the security risk factor of customer agent component:
In this stage, we calculate security risk factor of the component in a given scenario. This
can be done by using equation 7.
Rf(customer agent component)=Probability * Severity=(5/8)VI*(1)=5/8VI
We repeat the stages 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 so we can calculate the security risk factors of every
component in the system in this given scenario. We study another component (database customer
information component) and estimate the probability of security failure, severity of security
failure and the security factor. Figure 4- 8 shows the attack graph for a customer database
information component. We use the equations (2 & 3) to estimate the probability of security
failure. From the attack graph of customer information database, we can clearly see that the path
to this component is coming from the customer agent component through the message login.
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The severity of customer database component when a security failure occurs is 1. Customer
information component is a database component that keeps the username, password for every
customer and for administrator. The data sensitivity is high as it could lead to access to the whole
system. Thus the severity should be considered Critical. Taking the access right in the
consideration, this severity would become catastrophic.
Rf(customer information database component)=Probability * Severity=(5/16)VI*(1)=5/16VI
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Figure 4- 8 Attack Graph of customer information database component
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We form a list of risk factors for all components. Table 4- 1 shows the probabilities of security
failures, the severity of security failures, and the risk factors of all components in the buy a book
scenario.
Component

Probability

Severity

Risk
Factor

Customer

VI(6.5/8)

.6

.48VI

VI(5/8)

1

.62VI

VI(5/16)

1

.31VI

VI(5/16)

.6

.18VI

VI(5/8)

.6

.37VI

VI(5/8)

.6

.37VI

Interface
Customer
Agent
Customer
information
database
Books
database
Delivery
agent
Orders
database

Table 4- 1 Probabilities, severities and risk factors of all components in buy a
book scenario
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4.4 Conclusions and future work:
In Summary, this research describes methodologies for estimating probability of each
software architectural element at the software architectural level as well as severity of
security failures. The methodologies are based on UML specifications, Attack Graphs, Data
Sensitivity, Reachability Matrix, and Access rights. In estimating the probability of security
failures, the methodology uses the UML sequence diagram to develop the attack graph for
each element in a given scenario. Then we use probabilistic arguments to estimate the
probability of security failure for each component. The second methodology uses important
factors such as data sensitivity, reachability matrix, and access rights of each element to
estimate the severity of security failure.
In the future work we would develop a tool support that will help domain expert
apply these methodologies.
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Chapter 5
Validation Studies
5.1 Introduction:
Evaluation techniques can be one of these categories [42]:
1- Feature analysis
2- Surveys
3- Case study
4- Formal experiment
Validating security metrics requires huge efforts. It is difficult to validate software
attributes [27]. There is no agreement on a validation framework [6][27][36][61]. One of the
software features is security, and this feature is difficult to measure, therefore validating a
security measure is even more difficult.
Validation can be done generally theoretically or empirically [6] in software
engineering. Theoretical validation will show the measure is really measuring the attribute it
is purporting to measure. Empirical validation will show the measure is useful so that it is
related to other variables as defined in the theories.
Measurements are involved in evaluation, and they help separate typical from unusual
situations [42]. Measure is a mapping from a set of entities and attributes in the real empirical
world to a representation or model in the mathematical world. For example, Line of Code
(LOC) is a measure of software “length”, and then this value is handled in the mathematical
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world to get more information about the real world. Most of the software measures are
related to information about product, process, or resource’s attributes.
To understand software measurement, two types systems are considered:
 Measurement systems: used to assess existing entity by numerically
characterizing one or more of its attributes.
 Predication systems: used to predict some attribute of a future entity,
involving a mathematical model with associated prediction procedures.
Validating Software Measures: This type of validation must ensure the measure
captures the attribute property it is supposed to capture.
Validating Prediction Systems: This type of validation is done on prediction system in
a given environment by establishing its accuracy by empirical means. A comparison between
the model’s performances with known data in the given environment should be done. Two
different types of prediction systems in this category must be considered, deterministic
prediction systems, and stochastic prediction systems.
Note: some measures can serve both purposes, as an attribute measure and as input to
a prediction system. In our research, the security risk assessment plays dual role, attack graph
and Data Sensitivity, Access Rights, and Matrix Reachability are measures of software
attribute and that is security and also a prediction systems to indicate the security risk of that
software.
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5.2 Validating Software Measures and Prediction
Systems
5.2.1 Validating a Software Measure
The data collected from real life world can be used to validate a software
measure. One example is Microsoft Security Bulletins [37]. Statistical analysis can be
conducted using the data collected from Microsoft Security bulletins. The Bulletins show
how the vulnerabilities can be exploited on the code level using the software resource
from components, connectors and data. This can be done also on the architecture level
by mapping the components and connectors that are exploited. One of validation
methods is compatible with validations used in Kitchenham et al. [27]. In order to decide
whether a measure is valid, the following should be confirmed:
1- Attribute validity: i.e. whether the attributes we are interested in are exhibited
by the software.
2- Unit validity: the measurement unit is appropriate for an attribute.
3- Instrument validity: the model underlying a measurement is valid.
4- Protocol validity: an appropriate measurement protocol is adopted.

In our research, Data Sensitivity, Access Rights, and Matrix Reachability are used to
determine the severity of risk assessment. Messages, connectors, and data are ways to
establish attribute validity along with access rights for estimating the severity of security risk.
Similarly attack graphs use components and connectors along with messages exchanged
between components to establish attribute validity. UML model is used in the research and
can establish theoretical validity, and empirical studies based on Microsoft Security Bulletins
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can establish the attribute validity empirically. In the upcoming section, validation studies
and surveys can be used for validation.
In our research, there are no units used in the security risk assessment. However,
within the security risk assessment there are two elements; probability and severity. In
regards to the probability, there is no explicit unit. However the severity unit could be
Catastrophic, Critical, Major, Minor, or Low. Using Microsoft Bulletin and empirical study,
we use severity level to establish the unit validity. These levels for example could be high,
moderate or low level (high>moderate>low). Surveys are retrospective studies to try to
document relations and outcomes in a given situation. For example, software engineers’
surveys are similar to those when recording data to determine how project participants
reacted to a particular method, tool, or technique or to determine trends or relationships.
Surveys are commonly used to gather data from participants, engineers, developers,
customers, and end users. Measures from these groups about beliefs, trends, and attitude are
taken.
In our research, we use UML model along with attack graphs and Data Sensitivity,
Access Rights, and Matrix Reachability to determine the two parts of security risk
assessment. UML model is valid and widely used across researchers, communities, projects,
and companies. Therefore our security risk measurement consequently establishes instrument
validity.
Regarding the protocol validity Kitchenham et al.[27] suggests that a valid
measurement protocol must be clear and must prevent problems and invalid measurement
procedures such as double counting, so any protocol that satisfies this criteria is validated
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through researchers’ community agreement. Our research meets Kitchenham’s criteria; hence
our measurement is a valid measurement protocol.
In conclusion, our software measure (security risk assessment) satisfies the four
criteria of Kitchenham [27] as explained above, so we can conclude that our measure is valid.

5.2.2 Validating a Prediction System
In our research, we can show that a higher security risk (probability, severity) on any
component in the software architecture would lead to a higher number of attacks on that
component. Let us choose two components from the UML sequence diagram in a certain
scenario and a certain use case. We showed in research that component1 has higher
probability of security failure than component2 {for example customer interface has
probability of security failure P1=( )
probability P2 = ( )

, customer information database component has

} that would lead us that component 1 has higher attackability

chances than component 2. Consequently the security risk factor would be rf1>rf2 assuming
that they have the same severity level. In this way we are showing that using the theoretical
approach (UML, Attack graphs, Data Sensitivity, Access Rights, and Matrix Reachability, )
we are proving that a larger security risk factors on any component would lead to a larger
number of security attacks on our software.

Correlations between security risk measurements and patches of security
vulnerabilities in software can be built. Patching a software system improves system’s
security by reducing the probabilities of security risk and/or reducing severity of security
failure. Consequently the patch will decrease the security risk factors. Microsoft Security
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Bulletins have explanations on the severity resulting from the security failure and types of
components and data used to exploit vulnerabilities. Patching generally is implemented on
the code level, however on the architecture level we can prove that adding security protection
to the components exposed to high security risk would decrease the security risk factors of
these components. In our research, the most exposed components to the attackability are
customer interface and customer agent components. Patching or adding more secure layers
and technologies to these two components would lead us to reduce the security risk factors of
these components and consequently reduce the security risk factors of the scenario and the
use case.
In the following Table 5- 1, a summary is provided on the validation of a Software
Measure and the validation of a Prediction System.
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Measuring systems
Software Measure

Validity

Theoretical

Empirical

UML Model,

Microsoft Security

Unit Validity

Attack Graph, Data

Bulletin (MSB)

Instrument Validity

Sensitivity, Access

analysis, Survey

Protocol Validity

Rights, and Matrix

Attribute Validity

Reachability
Prediction System

Prediction Validity

UML, Attack

Microsoft Security

Graphs, Data

Bulletin, Survey,

Sensitivity, Access

Security Pattern

Rights, and Matrix
Reachability,

Table 5- 1 Summary of validations methods

5.3 Validation based on Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we make some changes to the parameters in the case studies in regards
to the vulnerability index (VI) and check the probabilities of security failures of the goal
components in that given scenario. Additionally, we make changes to our original
assumption on the initial probabilities where we assign different probabilities values to the
initial nodes in the attack graph and test how that impacts the probabilities of security failures
to certain goal components.

67

5.3.1 Vulnerability Index analysis:
In this section we will relax the values of vulnerability index and see how that would
change the values of probabilities of security failures of customer agent and customer
database information components. Figure 5- 1 shows how the probabilities of two
components change when VI changes. When VI =1, the estimated probabilities of customer
agent and customer information database components are .625 and .31 respectively assuming
the initial nodes have equally likely distributions. However in the coming sections we will
show the estimated probabilities of security failure when this assumption changes. In Figure
5- 1, we have changed the values of VI by .05.
Observations: We conclude the following:
1- Components with higher probabilities of security failures are more sensitive to VI values
than components with low probabilities of security failures. For example, the sensitivity
to VI for the customer agent component is significant. However the sensitivity to VI for
customer information database is insignificant because even if VI is equal to 1, the
probability of security failure of customer information database is around .31. The
estimated probability value .31 is still considered low comparing to the other estimated
probabilities of other components like customer interface or customer agent.
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Figure 5- 1 Probabilities of security failures of customer agent and customer
information database components when VI changes

5.3.2 Initial Probabilities Analysis:
The methodology of risk assessment presented in chapter 4 assumed that the initial
probabilities of security attacks are equal to the vulnerability index as specified in
equation 4. In this section, we analyze the validity of this assumption using Microsoft
Security Bulletin data collected from real life attacks on real systems. It is important
to consider other factors when assigning the initial probabilities values. The following
point should be taken when considering the initial probabilities values:


The outcome of any security attack falls in one of these categories, integrity
violation or confidentiality violation or availability violation or combinations
of these violations. Integrity means that there is change in data that includes
modify or delete or add to the data. Confidentiality means the attacker is
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reading a data without having the proper authorization. Availability in
security means that the component is not available because certain attacks
have flooded the component or the system with a lot of requests (denial of
service attacks are typical attacks that cause availability problems). Integrity
violation happens in terms of entering data to the system. Confidentiality
violation happens in terms of reading data from the systems. Availability
violation happens in terms of flooding the system with requests by sending
requests to the system and waiting for a response.
In this section, we show how initial probabilities values change according to the
above factors by using Microsoft Security Bulletins (MSB) [37] statistics. MSB could help us
determine what the favorite components that attacker prefers, and what security violations
happen more than others in terms of integrity, confidentiality, and availability. They could
have different values depending on the favorite systems components and on the violations in
confidentiality, integrity and availability. We will use the Microsoft Security Bulletins
(MSB) in 2004 as a reference to provide us with statistics regarding the integrity,
confidentiality and availability. We will use MSB database in 2004. Table 5- 2 shows the
number of total attacks, number of integrity violations, number of confidentiality violations,
and number of availability violations.
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Number of violations

Percentage %

Total number of security attacks

45

100

Number of security attacks in terms of

36

80

38

84

9

20

integrity violations
Number of security attacks in terms of
confidentiality violations
Number of security attacks in terms of
availability violations
Table 5- 2 Numbers of violation from MSB -2004
In Table 5- 3, we will assume initial probabilities values based on the previous
analysis of favorable components and types of violations.
Types of attacks

Confidentiality

Integrity

Availability

Initial probability

.84

.8

.2

Table 5- 3 Initial probabilities values for confidentiality, integrity availability
security violations
In Table 5- 4 we will connect the initial points of contacts in our case study to the
type of violations resulted from security attacks.
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Initial

point

of Potential

security Initial probability

attacks

violations

C1

Availability

.2VI

C2

Availability

.2VI

C3

Integrity

.8VI

C4

Confidentiality

.82VI

C5

Integrity

.8VI

C6

Confidentiality

.82VI

C7

Confidentiality

.82VI

C8

Integrity

.8VI

Table 5- 4 Initial Probabilities values of the case study e-commerce example

5.3.3 Severity analysis:
In this section, we test the severity of e-commerce components when we change the
access rights. Figure 5- 2 shows the severities of security failures for each component in the
ecommerce example in two states, with admin rights and without admin rights. The
components severities with admin rights will increase the severity level by one level and that
is in our case by .2. Figure 5- 3 compares the risk factors of ecommerce components taking
into the account the admin rights, and vulnerability index value is .1.
Observation: we conclude the following
1- There are components with high level of severity with admin access rights or
without admin rights. These are customer interface and customer agent. These
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components are not sensitive to admin access rights because their severity levels
stay at the high levels in both cases with admin or without admin access rights.
2- There are components that could be impacted when admin access rights are
considered. The severity level of these components will increase from minor to
major, which is considered a significant jump. For example, the severity level of
the order server database component will increase from minor to major. That
means the attacker could have access to the whole database or to one record.
These types of components are sensitive to the admin access right. This is an
intuitive conclusion.
3- When considering the severity analysis and the risk factor we conclude the
following:
a. Customer agent component is considered high risky components with
admin access right or without it.
b. Bookserver database component keeps low risk factor although his
severity sensitivity to admin access right is significant. This is because the
probability of security failure of this component is so low. That means
although this component is sensitive to the access rights, the attackability
on this component is difficult.
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Figure 5- 2 severities of security failures of e-commerce components
with/without admin rights

0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03

risk factor with admin access rights

0.02
0.01

0

risk factor without admin access
rights

Figure 5- 3 risk factors of software components in ecommerce example with
admin rights, without admin rights, VI=.1
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5.3.4 Risk factors analysis:
In the previous chapter we considered in the case study an equal likely distribution for
direct messages, however this might not be the case. In this section we test the security risk
factors for three components (customer agent and customer interface, bookserver database).
0.12

0.1

0.08

0.06
Risk factor for customer
agent

0.04

Risk Factor for customer
interface
0.02

Risk Factor for book
server database

0

Direct messages exploit probabilites change in each case, VI=.1

Figure 5- 4 Security risk factors for three components, customer agent, customer
interface, and bookserver database with 9 cases, VI=.1
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We take into the account the values of x1,x2,…x8 are not the same. We consider 9 cases.
In each case we estimate the probabilities of these three components with the assumption that
VI=.1. Figure 5- 4 shows how the security risk factors of the three components change when the
initial nodes probabilities change in 9 different cases.
Case 1: we assume equally likely distribution across all initial nodes.
Case 2 – case 9: we assume one initial node has a probability of 1 and the rest nodes have zero
probabilities.
Observations: we conclude the following:
1- The risk factor of customer agent component is high in case 8 and case 9 when the
probability of initial nodes x8 is one or x9 is one. This represents a direct attack coming
from the actor on the customer agent component through the exploitation of the direct
messages (2 direct messages); intuitively this is an expected result.
2- The risk factor of customer interface component is high in case 2 through case 7 when the
probability of initial nodes x1 is one or x2=1,…,x6=1. This represents a direct attack
coming from the actor on the customer interface component through the exploitation of
the direct messages (6 direct messages); intuitively this is an expected result.
3- The risk factor of book server component is high in case 8 and case 9 when the
probability of initial nodes x8 is one or x9 is one. This represents an indirect attack
through customer agent component; therefore this is an expected result. The bookserver
database component does not have a direct connection with the actors; however the attack
could happen through the message coming from the customer agent component.
4- In case 1, the risk factors of customer agent, customer interface, and book server database
show the averages of the two extreme cases explained in the above conclusions 1, 2, and
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3. This case does not show a real behavior in which there is an attack coming from a
source than another. For simplicity, we considered our example that all initial nodes have
equally likely distribution.
5- Figure 5- 5 Shows that the distributions of risk factors for each of the three components,
customer agent, customer interface, and bookserver database considering 9 cases.
6- The customer agent and book server database components have a similar trend, but the
only difference is the value of risk factors. This conclusion tells us that the direct
messages have more impact than the indirect messages on components from the security
failures standpoint.
7- The pattern of customer interface risk factor is different from the ones of customer agent
and book server, and this is intuitively because 6 out of 8 direct messages are connected
through customer interface and 2 out of 8 direct messages are connected to the customer
agent.
8- The customer interface component stays at its high risk value in more cases than the
customer agent. This conclusion results from the number of direct messages on customer
interface is more than the number of direct messages on the customer agent component.
9- In next section, we introduce the design security patterns that could be used on the
architectural level and will add more protection layers to the components. These patters
will help lower the security risk factors of components.
10- This proposed algorithm helps identify the consequences of security failure. By knowing
the severity of security breach, we can add extra security mechanisms around the
components with high severity and adding more security patterns so the probabilities and
severities of security breaches on the database components for example are reduced.
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Using security pattern as we discuss in the next section helps reduce the security risk
factor by either reducing the probability or severity of security failure.
0.12
0.1

Risk factor for customer
agent

0.08

Risk Factor for customer
interface

0.06

Risk Factor for book server
database

0.04
0.02
0

Figure 5- 5 The distributions of risk factors for the three components, customer
agent, customer interface, and bookserver database

5.4 Security Design Patterns
There have been many security approaches to patch the systems vulnerabilities.
However these approaches are considered temporarily solutions and after passing certain
time they become out of date or insufficient solution to today’s problems. These patterns are
mostly implemented to cover security problems on the code level and to address specific
problem. They don’t know address the root of the problem. In other words they are reactive
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to specific issues. In contrast, design patterns tell the architects how to design a system given
a statement of problem and set of forces that act upon the system. Patterns provide
information system architects a method for defining reusable solutions to design problems
without ever having to talk about or write program code; they are truly programming
language-independent. The following two examples [2] provide solutions of security design
patterns, and a methodology for using those patterns to design a secure system, which will
enable software architects and system designers to produce system architecture that meets
security requirements and could be used methods of validation when using these patterns.

5.4.1 Example1: Secure Communication Pattern:
A Connector between two components or component and an actor may be subject to
various security threats. The security provided by an external actor will not be effective if it
is exposed by attackers on the connectors. Therefore it is desirable to protect the connector.
Some attacks against the connectors carrying the messages:
1- Unauthorized Disclosure of Traffic
2- Unauthorized Modification of Traffic
3- Impersonation of an actor to the connection

Applicability:
We consider using this pattern when:
1- Sensitive information is exchanged between the actors and the system
2- Traffic in the connectors may be subject to security attacks
Structure: Figure 5- 6 shows the structure of Secure Communication Pattern.
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External Actor

Actor Proxy

Connector

Component

Component Proxy

Figure 5- 6 Structure of Secure Communication Pattern
Participants:
1- External Actor/Component: the source and or/destination of messages to be sent over the
connector
2- Connector: Carries messages exchanged between actors and system’s components
3- Proxy: Protect Traffic sent over the connector using one of a variety of protection
mechanisms.
Collaborations:
1- An external actor submits a message to its proxy for protection
2- The actor proxy applies appropriate protection to the message
3- The actor proxy uses the connector to transmit the message to the component proxy.
4- Component proxy will verify the message and decode the message. And return the
verified message to the receiver.
Figure 5- 7 shows the original sequence diagram without any security patterns. Figure
5- 8 shows the attack graph when customer agent is considered a goal node without adding
any security patterns. Figure 5- 9 represents the sequence diagram of the Secure
Communication Pattern. The actor will send the message to his proxy to protect this message.
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The proxy then sends out the message on the connector. The component proxy then receives
the protected message and does the verification part, and passes the message to the
destination component.
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External
system

Ecommerce system

Ecommerce system

External system

Cci1
<<actor>> customer

customer interface

Customer agent (g) <<database>>customer
information

<<database>> books server delivery agent

<<database>>orders server

<<actor>>Financial Institute

Access main page() 1.1
t1
c1
main page() 1.2
t2
c2

login(user name+ password) 2.1
c3
t3
send(user name+ password) 2.2
tia1
userinformationquery(username+password) 2.3
verified() 2.4
loginconfirm() 2.5
c4

loginconfirm() 2.6
t4

buy(book,creditcard) 3.1
c5
t5
buy(book,creditcard) 3.2
tia3 search(book) 3.3
bookavailable() 3.4

reservefunds(creditcard,customerinformation) 3.5

fundreserved() 3.8

t7

t8

c7

c8

generateordernumber() 3.9
orderstatus() 3.10
orderstatus() 3.11
c6
t6

buyrequest(ordernumber, address, book) 4.1
writeorderdata(ordernumber, address, books) 5.1

Figure 5- 7: UML sequence diagram without any security patterns
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g

tia1

tia3

Cci

t1

c1

t2

c2

t3

c3

t4

c4

t5

c5

t6

c6

t7

t8

c7

c8

Figure 5- 8: Attack Graph of customer agent without any security patterns
We choose one message from our scenario, and that is login(username, password).
The actor sends this message to the actor proxy. The actor proxy adds more protection to this
specific message and sends it out to the system through a connector. The customer interface
proxy will receive the message and verify it and pass it to the customer agent. Figure 5- 10
shows the UML sequence diagram of the buy a book scenario when customer agent is chosen
as a goal node and after adding the security communication pattern to it.
Consequences:
When using a secure communication pattern:
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1- We ensure the messages and data carried inside the message sent over potentially
insecure communication connector is protected against known threats
2- It may increase communication latency and costs
3- It may reduce communication throughputs
4- It may need to use certain security algorithms and need to comply with international standards

Actor

Actor Proxy

Connector

Component Proxy

Component

submit message

Protect

Send Message

deliver

Verify

delivermessage

Figure 5- 9: UML sequence diagram of secure communication pattern
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Implementation:
Secure communication proxies may apply one or more of the following types of
protection to messages in order to counter threats anticipated in the communication
connector:
1- Data Authentication protects against misrepresentation of identity of a send of
message
2- Peer Authentication protects against impersonation attack
3- Data Integrity protects against Tampering with data attacks
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External
system

Ecommerce
system

External
system

customer interface (Cci)
<<actor>> customer

Actor proxy

Component proxy

Customer agent (g)

Access main page() 1.1
main page() 1.2

C1
C2

<<actor>>Financial Institute

T1
T2

login(user name+ password) 2.1
C3

protect

T3

login(user name+ password) 2.1

verify
login(user name+ password) 2.1
send(user name+ password) 2.2
C4
C5

loginconfirm() 2.6

T4

Tia1

buy(book,creditcard) 3.1
T5

buy(book,creditcard) 3.2
Tia3

reservefunds(creditcard,customerinformation) 3.5 C7
T7
fundreserved() 3.6
C8
T8

C6

orderstatus() 3.9
T6

Figure 5- 10: UML sequence diagram of customer agent after adding secure
communication pattern

Figure 5- 11 represents the attack graph of customer agent component after adding a
security communication pattern to one connector. The path from C3 t3 Cci tia1 is eliminated.
Thus estimating the probability of security failure of customer agent component is:
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Table 5- 5 shows the probability of security failure of customer agent component
before adding the secure communication pattern and after adding it. We can conclude that
RF2<RF1 after adding this pattern to the architecture assuming that the component still has
the same severity.

Component

Customer agent

Probability of security failure Probability of security failure
before adding security pattern

after adding security pattern

5/8 VI

(3.5)/8 VI

Table 5- 5 security risk factors of customer agent component before /after
adding secure communication pattern
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tia1

tia3
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t1

c2

c1

t3

t4

c
3

c4

t5

c5

t6

c6

t7

t8

c7

c8

Figure 5- 11: Attack Graph of customer agent after adding a security
communication pattern

5.4.2 Example2: Policy Pattern:
Intent:
Isolate policy enforcement to separate components of sensitive data information. Ensure
that policy enforcement activities are performed in the proper sequence.
Motivation:
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Many software architectures, systems, and components need to enforce policy. In such
cases, the policy enforcement must be invoked in the correct sequence at every time there is any
access to certain database component. We could use the same policy enforcement to protect
more than one database component.
Structure: Figure 5- 12 shows the structure of Policy Pattern.

Guard

External Actor

Authenticator component

Security Context

Policy

Rule

Figure 5- 12: Structure of Policy Pattern
Participants:
1- External actor: request access to certain database component or resource in the
architecture
2- Authenticator component: Authenticates external actors who may want to have access
to certain components in the architecture.
3- Guards:
a. Collects users,
b. request, target and context attributes needed to make access control on certain
component
c. Request access control decisions from the policy
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d. Rejects or grant requests based on the policy
e. Sequences messages operations related to policy enforcement.
4- Security Context: Keeps credentials and security information for use in policy
decisions
5- Policy:
a. Makes decisions to grant or deny access to certain database components based
on actor attributes, request attributes, context attributes, and policy
b. Encapsulates a set of Rules determining which actors can perform which
operations on which components.
6- Rule: it is a component of the policy expressing the permission for a specified set of
Clients to perform a specified set of operations on a specified set of database
components
Collaborations:
1- The external actor requests access to the Gaurd
2- The authenticator causes the user’s security attributes to be included in the effective
security context
3- The Guard determines the request, target, and context attributes
4- The Guard requests a policy decision
5- The policy checks which of the set of rules matches the security attributes, requested
operation, and the targeted resource
6- If the Rules indicate that the request should be denied, the Policy returns a
notification to the Guard, which then passes a failure notification to the Client
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7- If the Policy result indicated that the request should be granted, the Guard passes the
request to the resource and replays the response back to the Client.
Consequences:
1- Ensures that security policy is checked before actor requests for database information
access are granted
2- Provides a single point of control for policy related activities
3- Imposes performance overhead: Separating policy enforcement from request
fulfillment will usually introduce network overhead.

In our example, a policy pattern could be implemented in the customer agent
component when accessing customer information database component. Rule could be:
1- If Administrators credentials are authenticated and remote access to information
database component is requested, deny access
2- If Administrators credentials are authenticated and local access to information
database component is requested, grant access
Table 5- 6 illustrates the difference in severity when adding policy pattern to the
architecture. RF1>RF2 and RF3>RF4.
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Actor

Authenticator

Guard

Security Context

Policy

Rule

authenticate

setContext

request

getContext

allowAccess
allowAccess

(denied)

Figure 5- 13: UML sequence diagram of Policy Pattern
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Component

Severity of security failure Severity of security failure after
before adding policy pattern

adding policy pattern

Catastrophic

Critical

Customer information Catastrophic

Critical

Customer agent

database

Table 5- 6 security risk factors of customer agent and customer information
database components before/after adding policy pattern

5.4.3 Integrating Security Risk Assessment with other quality attributes:
In the previous sections, we introduced two design patterns that could be used in the
design phase and improve the security attributes and risk of components. This leads to
improvements in the quality of software attributes from security standpoint. However, adding
such patterns for example could increase the response time of the components in the system
to the external actors. This might result in violating the requirements of such a system, and
could cause increase in the requirement risk of the components in the system. Therefore, it is
important to integrate the software attributes such as requirement, reliability, maintainability,
and security all during the early phases of software life cycle as improving the risk of one
might cause increase for the others. Integration all these software attributes will improve the
quality of software and will help avoid the rule of fix it later. In this research, we introduce
our methodology at the early phases where it could be integrated with other risk assessment
methodologies to improve the quality of overall software attributes. Similarly, improving the
reliability risk assessment of software components could increase the security risk of these
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components. Therefore, it is significant to integrate all these risk assessments when
developing software at the early phases of software life cycle.
In this section, we show how security risk assessment could be integrated to the other
types of risk assessment tool. Software Architecture Risk Assessment (SARA) tool [63] is a
tool used to that support architectural level model-based risk assessment, which includes
reliability-based risk, requirements-based risk and maintainability-based risk. This tool can
be extended to cover the security risk assessment since the security risk assessment is based
on UML specifications extracted on the architectural level. In the security risk assessment,
we depend on the use cases, scenarios, and sequence diagram to develop the attack graph.
We also depend on the reachability matrix that could be extracted from the UML sequence
diagram. Access rights and data classifications of components could easily be extracted from
the specifications of the components attributes. The Figure 5- 14 shows how security based
assessment could be integrated with other assessment using SARA tool. UML software (i.e.
RT Rose, Java, Visio) is used to provide the architecture software repository with use cases,
sequence diagrams. Then the attack graphs, schedules, Reachability Matrix, access rights,
and components specification are extracted from the repository to estimate the probability
and severity of components.
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Requirement based
risk
Reliability based risk

Maintainability
based risk

Security based risk
User
Interface

complexity
Attack Graphs
Size of change
Dynamic coupling
Change propagation
probabilities
Error Propagation
probabilities

Reachability matrix,
components classifications,
access rights

Software Architecture Artifacts Repository

Java understand Parser

UML RT Parser

StarUML Parser

Visio UML

Figure 5- 14 The architecture of the Software Architecture Risk Assessment
(SARA) Tool
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5.5 Microsoft Security Bulletin Analysis
In this section, a correlation between the patches introduced in the Microsoft security
bulletins [37] and security risk assessment analysis is established. We prove that these
resources are used to validate our technique using Microsoft security Bulletin analysis.
Microsoft Security Bulletins [37] describe vulnerabilities and resources (Component, Data,
and Connectors) that attacker can use to exploit the software components on the code level.
Additionally MSB has its own way of rating the severity. This includes four levels Critical,
Important, Moderate, and Low. In our research, there is a rating of severity level for each
type of attack. Patching on the code level is the same as adding more secure layers to the
components on the architecture level. The following Table 5- 7 compares the MSB on the
code level with its equivalent on the architecture level.
Empirical studies are part of the empirical validation to validate security risk
assessment. This can be done through several ways. One of these ways is to do empirical and
experimental case studies and empirical data, another way is through surveys.
One of the challenges to establish such a validation is to correlate between the patches
and our security risk assessment. Meaning not all patches are relevant to the security risk
assessment in our scenarios, consequently a patch is correlated to our security risk
assessment if we expect that patch to impact our software on the architectural level. Another
challenge is to map (convert) the impact and elements of that patch from the code level to the
architectural level. Additionally not all relevant patches will reduce the security risk factors.
We conclude that building an empirical validation can’t be established in short term, it may
take years to complete the validation work.
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MSB

Severity

Resources

Affected

rating

Likelihood

Protection

Software

(Impact)
Code level

Critical,

Software

Software

Microsoft

Apply

Important

components

components or

Exploitabilit

patch

Moderate

data, functions

data (i.e.

y Index

Low

Windows, IE,
Database..)

Architecture

Catastrophic,

Components,

Architectural

Probability

Adding

level

Critical,

connectors,

Components, or

of Security

secure

Major,

data,

data

failure

layers to

Minor,

the

Low

component
/connectors

Table 5- 7 Comparison between MSB on code level and its map on architectural
level
The following Table 5- 8 shows the correlations between how patches could improve
the security risk factors on code level and on the architectural level.
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Level

Risk factors before applying the Risk factors after applying the
patch

patch

Code level

Value 1

Value2

Architectural level

Rf1

Rf2

Table 5- 8 Security Risk Factor before and after applying patches
If value2 < value1 and Rf2<Rf1, we can conclude the validation is established on the
architectural level.
In this section, we show experimentally that a correlation between patching on code
level and architecture could be built and will help improve the risk factors. [37] is a reference
to all Microsoft security bulletins for the last 10 years. In our research, we will be studying
some bulletins from 2004 list.
We will study the Patch MS04-012. Table 5- 9 explains the details of this
vulnerability security bulletin and its mapping on the architectural level.
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Patch #

MSB 04-012

Vulnerability on the
Architectural level

Impact of Vulnerability

Remote Code Execution

Change, delete, review data

Maximum severity rating

Critical

Catastrophic

What might an attacker use the

Take complete control of an

Unauthorized review of

vulnerability to do?

affected system, including installing

data, modify data,

programs; viewing, changing, or
deleting data; or creating new
accounts that have full privileges.
How could an attack exploit this

An attacker could log on to the

Log on to the system

vulnerability?

system interactively or by using

remotely, send certain

another program that passes

messages to the components

parameters to the vulnerable
component (locally or remotely).

Affected software

Remote Procedure Call (RPC) in

Customer agent component

Operating system
Severity before applying patch

Critical

Catastrophic

Mitigation factor

Apply Patch

Apply the policy pattern (No
log on remotely with Admin
rights)

Severity after applying patch

Low

Major

Table 5- 9: Vulnerability of MSB04-012 and its maps on the architectural level
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Figure 5- 15 shows the UML sequence diagram and the policy pattern applied on the customer
agent component. The policy pattern will help either approve the log on locally with admin rights
or decline the log on remotely with admin rights. In the example we showed that the severity of
security failure is reduced by one level as no admin rights are granted for remote users.

External
system

Policy Pattern:
Log on remotely with admin access right=false
Log on locally with admin access right =true

Ecommerce system

Ecommerce system

External system

Cci1
<<actor>> customer

customer interface

Customer agent (g)

<<database>>customer
information

<<database>> books server

delivery agent

<<database>>orders server

<<actor>>Financial Institute

Access main page() 1.1
t1
c1
main page() 1.2
t2
c2

login(user name+ password) 2.1
c3
t3
send(user name+ password) 2.2
tia1
userinformationquery(username+password) 2.3
verified() 2.4
loginconfirm() 2.5
loginconfirm() 2.6
t4
Crafted message 1

c4

Crafted message n
buy(book,creditcard) 3.1
c5
t5
buy(book,creditcard) 3.2
tia3
search(book) 3.3
bookavailable() 3.4
t7

reservefunds(creditcard,customerinformation) 3.5
fundreserved() 3.8

t8

c7
c8

generateordernumber() 3.9
orderstatus() 3.10
c6

orderstatus() 3.11
t6

buyrequest(ordernumber, address, book) 4.1
writeorderdata(ordernumber, address, books) 5.1

Figure 5- 15: UML sequence diagram with MSB04-012 vulnerability and policy
pattern
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We will study another Patch MS04-023. Table 5- 10 explains the details of this
vulnerability security bulletin and its mapping on the architectural level.
Patch #

MSB 04-023

Vulnerability on the
Architectural level

Impact of Vulnerability

Remote Code Execution

Change, delete, review
data

Maximum severity rating

Critical

Catastrophic or Critical

What might an attacker use the

An attacker who successfully

The hacker has the same

vulnerability to do?

exploited this vulnerability could

privilege as the user

gain the same privileges as the

logging on.

user. Users whose accounts are
configured to have fewer
privileges on the system would
be at less risk than users who
operate with administrative
privileges.

How could an attack exploit this

To exploit this vulnerability,

Through the

vulnerability?

an attacker would have to

connectors carrying

host a malicious Web site and

the messages between

then persuade a user to view

the outside world and

that Web site. An attacker

the system,

could also create an HTML
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e-mail message that contains
a specially crafted link, and
then persuade a user to view
the HTML e-mail message
and then click the link.

Affected software

Internet protocol

Customer agent, customer
interface components

Mitigation factor

Apply Patch

Apply the secure
communication pattern
(on the connectors when a
user logon)

Probability after applying patch

Reduced

(3.5/8) VI

Table 5- 10: Vulnerability of MSB04-023 and its map on the architectural level
Figure 5- 16 shows the UML sequence diagram with secure communication pattern. This pattern
will confirm that the logon process between the actor and the system is secured and no attacker
can intercept this message and exploit this vulnerability. Patch MS04-023 discusses one of the
internet protocols that have some functionality where an attacker could exploit to take a complete
control of a system. This vulnerability is eliminated on the code level by applying the patch.
Since we are assuming in our example that the internet is used to carry the messages between the
actors and the components of our system, the vulnerability is existed and could be exploited if no
design pattern is placed. In our example we take proactive step by applying the secure
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communication pattern. An example of such a pattern is a digital signature between the two
parties, or what we call the actor and system proxies.
Secure communication Pattern:
Actor Proxy, System Proxy

Ecommerce system
Ecommerce system
External
system

External system

Cci1

<<actor>> customer

customer interface

Customer agent (g)

<<database>>customer
information

<<database>> books server delivery agent

<<database>>orders server

<<actor>>Financial Institute

Access main page() 1.1
t1
c1
main page() 1.2
t2
c2

login(user name+ password) 2.1
c3
t3
send(user name+ password) 2.2
tia1
userinformationquery(username+password) 2.3
verified() 2.4
loginconfirm() 2.5
c4

loginconfirm() 2.6
t4
Crafted message 1
Crafted message n

buy(book,creditcard) 3.1
c5
t5
buy(book,creditcard) 3.2
tia3
search(book) 3.3
bookavailable() 3.4
t7

reservefunds(creditcard,customerinformation) 3.5
fundreserved() 3.8

t8

c7
c8

generateordernumber() 3.9
orderstatus() 3.10
orderstatus() 3.11
c6
t6

buyrequest(ordernumber, address, book) 4.1
writeorderdata(ordernumber, address, books) 5.1

Figure 5- 16: UML sequence diagram with MSB04-023 vulnerability and secure
communication pattern
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5.4 Conclusions
Software Engineering processes are changing rapidly, and there are many factors
involved in these processes. Varieties of software development techniques make it hard to get
statistical sets for empirical studies. However the empirical results obtained from using
limited resources are still valuable. Validation could be considered one of research areas that
needs a big attention and a huge effort and might take long time to complete.

104

Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Work
Several conclusions emerge from this research. We conclude that this work is a
promising and significant step in meeting our research objectives: to develop a security risk
assessment methodology based on measurable parameters that could be collected and
analyzed in the early software design phase based on UML artifacts, Attack Graph, data
sensitivity, access rights and reachability matrix.
This research develops an architectural-level security-based risk assessment
methodology. In this research we propose a methodology for security risk assessment based
on the UML specifications such as uses cases, sequence diagram that can be used in the early
phases of software life cycle. The proposed methodology uses attack graph, access rights,
data sensitivity, and reachability matrix.
The risk assessment methodology presented in this proposal considers component
security risk factors. It is used for calculating the risk factors of various components at the
architectural level. We combine the probability of software security element failure with the
severity of that failure to estimate the risk factor of software architectural elements.
We estimate the probability of security element failure based on the UML sequence
diagrams and attack graphs. We develop the attack graph for each component from a given
UML sequence diagram. Then we use probabilistic arguments to estimate the probability of
security failure for that component. The proposed metrics could be obtained at early
development phases from UML models.
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To estimate the severity of security failure we present a new methodology that takes
into the account multiple factors when evaluating the worst case consequences. These factors
are component classifications based on data sensitivity, access rights, and reachability matrix
for elements in the system. This methodology describes an algorithm for estimating severity
of each software architectural component. Data sensitivity analysis helps classify database
components based on the significance of data that each component uses. Access rights
determine whether a message is executed with admin rights or non admin rights.
Reachability matrix presents how high or low the components are coupled with each other.
We conducted two studies to validate our proposed methodologies based on the
design security patterns. We applied these studies on Microsoft security bulletins.
In summary the proposed methodologies are efficient methods to estimate security
risk factors on different levels of software design. They enable us to estimate software
components risk factors that enable us to focus on the high risk elements even though they
may be rarely used and therefore may not contribute significantly to the overall system risk
factor.
Our future work is focused on generalization of the methodology presented in this
research. Another future work could be is to automate the process of estimating the security
risk assessment of more complex systems since our methodologies are entirely analytical and
provide a closed form solution.
In the future, we could also do the following:


Extend the security risk assessment methodology to handle cloud computing
solution as the future businesses are emerging in this area.
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Integrate the current security risk assessment tool with other kinds of risk
tools (i.e. maintainability risk, performance risk, requirement risk, reliability
risk)



Extend the mitigation actions required as a result of risk assessment by
developing more security patterns and integrate these patterns on the
architectural level case studies.



Extend the testing of validations on the architectural level before the systems
go live to implementation or code level.



For large scale system where big attack graphs are built using an automated
tool, we may need to use Bayesian network to calculate the probabilities of
intermediate nodes, and goal nodes.



Extend the proposed algorithm to be applied not only at the architectural or
Application Programming Interface (API) level, but also at physical layer,
network level, session layer, and data link layer in Open Systems
Interconnection model (OSI).
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